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ABSTRACT. Green income accounting models are designed to appropriately value
changes in a country’s natural resource (natural capital) base. However, green NNP is
useful as a guide for domestic and international policy only to the extent that it accu-
rately reflects the economic goals and policy options of policy makers. For example,
international policy designed to slow natural capital depletion in a developing country
is more effective if policy makers recognize the developing country’s perceived income
effects of the policy. Traditional green accounting models do not satisfy this criterion
because they are based on the assumption that policy makers are either not concerned
with the distributional consequences of policies, and/or are not limited in the instru-
ments available to them. We present an alternative green NNP measure that reflects
distributional goals and policy implementation. Using this measure, the depletion
(accumulation) of natural capital stocks in excess of economically efficient rates may
increase income.
1. Introduction
Traditional income accounting systems have been criticised in recent years
because changes in a country’s natural resource (natural capital) base are
excluded from traditional NNP measures (see Mäler, 1991, or Hanley,
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Shogren and White, 1997). Indeed, there has been a growing interest in
modifying traditional NNP measures to include changes in natural capital
and environmental quality, thereby providing a more complete and accu-
rate measure of social income and welfare (Hartwick, 1990; Mäler, 1991;
Repetto, 1992). One goal of ‘green NNP’ measures is to properly treat
changes in natural capital so that green NNP is truly a measure of the
maximum amount that could be consumed in one period without reducing
consumption in future periods, or ‘sustainable income’ (Weitzman, 1997;
Weitzman and Löfgren, 1997). Much of the recent economic ‘green
accounting’ literature provides a conceptual framework for a sustainable
income measure (e.g., Hartwick, 1990; Mäler, 1991; Weitzman, 1997).
Following Aronsson and Löfgren (1995), we refer to the basic measure of
sustainable income as the Weitzman–Hartwick–Mäler (W–H–M) measure
(henceforth NNPW–H–M).
There are two important potential limitations to NNPW–H–M. The first
limitation, which has been identified in previous literature (e.g., Hartwick,
1990; Dasgupta, 1993, 1997), relates to the fact that NNPW–H–M is derived
under the assumption that an economy’s consumption and investment
decisions follow an economically efficient path. However, natural
resources are most often allocated inefficiently and externalities are not
fully corrected. This is especially true in developing countries (Dasgupta,
1997, 1993). Market data on consumption levels, prices, and changes in
capital and natural capital stocks will differ from their counterparts in
NNPW–H–M because the decisions made along an economically inefficient
path are not equivalent to those that would be made along an economically
efficient path (Hrubovcak, Le Blanc and Eakin, 1995).1 In addition, shadow
values of changes in capital and natural capital that are measured using
market data will be biased (Dasgupta, 1993).
The second potential limitation of NNPW–H–M relates to its effectiveness
as a tool for assessing economic performance and guiding policy choices
when policy makers have distributional goals and/or limited policy
options. Green NNP is useful as a performance measure and a guide for
domestic and international policy only to the extent that it accurately
reflects policy makers’ goals and policy options. However, NNPW–H–M is
limited in that the assumptions underlying its derivation presuppose that
economic efficiency is the goal of policy makers. Under the assumption of
economic efficiency, public policies to modify resource use are warranted
when imperfect or missing markets cause a loss of social economic value
relative to the allocation that maximises the net present value of economic
benefits accruing to society as a whole. These benefits include scarcity rent
due to the resource, consumers’ surplus, and rents for factors of produc-
tion that are not supplied at a constant cost to the resource industry (with
exogenous prices for inputs and outputs, this amounts to maximising rent
to the industry) (see, e.g., Freeman, 1993; Clark, 1990; Conrad, 1995).
Economic efficiency is consistent with the maximisation of social welfare
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1 In the presence of externalities, NNPWHM is an economically efficient benchmark
income level that can only be measured using bioeconomic modelling and/or
other simulation methods.
when the public sector uses non-distortionary policies (i.e., lump sum
transfers) to adjust income distributions. However, contemporary welfare
economics (e.g., the ‘New New Welfare Economics’) rejects the feasibility
of non-distortionary inter- and intra-generational transfers to achieve dis-
tributional objectives, and suggests that both efficiency and distributional
effects should be considered in optimal policy design (see, e.g., Feldstein,
1972; Stiglitz, 1987; Gardner, 1987b). In a related but somewhat different
vein, public choice theory and applied research suggest economic
efficiency is not a major consideration in actual resource policy. Instead,
policy makers seem to be particularly concerned with the economic
welfare of politically powerful interest groups with a direct economic
interest in the use of resources and equity issues (e.g., Mueller, 1989; Hahn,
1990; Gardner, 1987b; Holden, 1994; Anderson, 1984; Coull, 1993; Clark,
1985; Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986; Coates, 1996; and Rausser and Foster,
1991).2 This may be especially true in many developing countries where
interest groups heavily influence government policies, creating incentives
(e.g., through income redistribution) for farmers to deplete natural capital
stocks (Dasgupta, 1997, 1993). Indeed, although applied literature suggests
economic growth in many developing countries is not sustainable in terms
of the natural resource base (Repetto et al., 1989; Pearce and Atkinson,
1995), policies often lead to environmental degradation and natural
resource depletion (Dasgupta, 1993). It is therefore realistic to assume poli-
cies are designed to allocate resources within the context of policy makers’
preferences over politically valued groups, not to maximise aggregate
economic surplus.3
In this paper, we develop a measure of green NNP that accounts for
changes in natural capital and incorporates the distributional goals of
policy makers. Specifically, policy makers are assumed to be concerned
about the distribution of economic welfare among groups within society,
as well as the total social surplus. Following economic literature on regu-
lation in other sectors (e.g., Gardner, 1987b; Rausser, Lichtemberg and
Lattimore, 1982; Peltzman, 1976; and Becker, 1974), we assume policy
makers seek to maximise a political preference function defined over the
economic surplus that accrues to the politically valued groups. The under-
lying argument is that the agency’s preferences are an equilibrium
outcome of the interaction of interest groups and political decision makers
in political markets (Mueller, 1986). The NNP measure derived under this
approach will be appropriate to gauge performance and guide policy
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2 Policy makers’ concerns with the distributional impacts of policies have also been
recognised and studied in other sectors such as agriculture (Gardner, 1987a;
Oehmke and Yao, 1990; Shortle and Laughland, 1994) and electric utilities (Nelson
and Roberts, 1989).
3 Rausser (1982) describes resource policies as political economic resource transac-
tions policies (PERTs) or political economic-seeking transfer policies (PESTs)
according to whether they are intended to enhance efficiency by addressing
market failures (PERTs) or to enhance the welfare of particular interest groups
(PESTs). In general, resource policies will contain aspects of both PERTs and
PESTs, where ‘PERTs expand the size of the pie, and PESTs allocate the portions
served’ (Rausser and Foster, 1990).
because it incorporates the actual shadow values that society, as a result of
public intervention, places on reproducible and natural capital.
2. The model
2.1 The economy
Consider an economy that produces a single composite good, Y, according
to the concave production function f(αK, βL, h) (fi  0, i  K, L, h), where K
is aggregate reproducible capital (henceforth, capital), L is aggregate
labour, α  1 and β  1 are, respectively, the proportions of K and L used
in the production of Y and h is a natural resource commodity.4 Total pro-
duction, f, can either be sold for consumption, C, or invested, I, into the
capital stock
f(αK, βL, h)  C  I. (1)
The capital stock evolves over time according to the equation of motion 
K˙  I  δK, where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Using (1), the
equation of motion for capital accumulation can be written as
K˙  f(αK, βL, h)  C  δK. (2)
Natural capital, denoted X, is harvested by a competitive resource
industry, which has open access to the resource stock. Such an industry
would harvest the resource inefficiently in the absence of public interven-
tion to correct the market failure. Harvesting of the natural resource occurs
according to the concave production function h([1  α] K,[1  β]L, X) (hi 
0, i  K, L, X). For simplicity, it is assumed that labour for each production
activity is hired from the same market. The natural capital stock evolves
according to the equation of motion
X˙  g(X)  h, (3)
where g(X) (g ′′  0, g(0)  g(X¯)  0, where X¯ is the largest resource stock
level that can be sustained naturally by the ecosystem, i.e., the carrying
capacity) describes the natural reproduction of X (g(X)  0 ∀ X in the case
of a non-renewable resource).
2.2 Social welfare and public policy goals
Consider a social planner (e.g., a government) who values differently the
economic welfare of various groups with an economic interest in the pro-
duction of the consumption good, and whose preferences are manifested
through social policy choices. Assuming lump sum transfers can be used
to costlessly redistribute income, a fundamental result of welfare econ-
omics is that a social preference function, defined over the utility of all
agents in the economy (or, equivalently, aggregate economic surplus), is
maximised by choosing policy instruments to obtain a Pareto optimum
and using lump sum transfers to optimally redistribute income (Blanchard
and Fischer, 1993; Gardner, 1987b; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Starrett,
1989). However, lump sum transfers often have practical limitations (e.g.,
some redistributions may involve welfare from future to current gener-
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4 Alphabetical subscripts denote partial derivatives. For example, fL  ∂f/∂L.
ations) and are typically passed up in favour of policies with more direct
market intervention. Without lump sum transfers, solutions to traditional
accounting models founded on utility-based social welfare functions may
be unattainable.
Blanchard and Fischer (1993) suggest a more realistic and appropriate
objective function would be defined directly over relevant macroeconomic
variables, or aggregate market-based measures of economic welfare. Such
a function, which they refer to as a macro welfare function, is more repre-
sentative of how policies are actually made. In keeping with the public
choice literature, we adopt the term political preference function (PPF)
(Rausser and Foster, 1990).5
For simplicity, assume preferences are defined over three groups: con-
sumers, firms and labour. This choice of groups is consistent with the
political preference approach because these groups correspond to those
that often influence natural resource policy (e.g., Holden, 1994; Anderson,
1984; Coull, 1993; Clark, 1985, and Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986; Coates,
1996; and Rausser and Foster, 1991). The economic welfare measures
associated with these groups are consumers’ surplus (CS  ∫C0 p(v)dv 
p(C)C), firms quasi-rents (PS  p(C)C  w(L)L) and labour rents (LR 
w(L)L  ∫L0 w(v)dv), where p(C) (pc  0) denotes inverse demand for the con-
sumption good and w(L) (wL  0) denotes inverse labour supply.
6 The PPF
defined over these welfare measures is written as W (CS, PS, LR) (Wi  0, 
i  CS, PS, LR) and is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave.7 This PPF is
general enough to encompass both the economic goals of policy makers
and the manner in which policies are implemented (e.g., direct market
intervention or lump sum transfers). Therefore, this framework can be
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5 Public choice models can be broadly defined as either voting models or interest
group models. Interest group models include models with an influence function,
composite utility models and campaign contribution models (Potters and van
Winden, 1996). The composite utility (i.e., PPF) approach is used here because of
its relative simplicity and because it is best suited for the objectives of this study.
This approach is based on the assumption that the planner’s preferences reflect
the outcome of the interplay of interest groups in political-economic markets. The
interplay of agents is not modelled explicitly. The explicit modelling of strategic
behaviour, while important, will only serve to complicate the model and draw
attention away from the main focus which is to look at the impact of political pref-
erences on resource policy. Instead, the PPF acts as a black box and serves as the
planner’s objective function when choosing policies.
6 For simplicity, demand for the consumption good and labour supply are taken to
be Marshallian for use as welfare approximations. Welfare is more accurately
measured with Hicksian demand and supply relationships. The use of
Marshallian relationships greatly simplifies the analysis without a great loss in
generality.
7 This is but one possible specification for the PPF. The number of possible objec-
tives is extreme and may be quantitative (e.g., income and employment levels,
existence values), or qualitative in nature (e.g., traditions, cultural values, etc.). We
focus on the elements comprising economic surplus because of the economic
interest associated with these welfare measures. In addition, this specification
allows for comparison of our results with previous work that only focuses on
economic efficiency as the goal of the planner.
used to derive a measure of NNP that is consistent with policy goals and
implementation, while also consistent with applied welfare economics.
3. The command optimum
We focus on a ‘command optimum’, noting that the planner has access to
a variety of policy instruments to attain this optimum.8 The planner’s
problem is to choose values of C, L, α and β to maximise discounted social
welfare over time, subject to the capital and natural capital equations of
motion
∞
0
W(CS, PS, LR)ertdt
s.t. (2), (3),
L  T
where r denotes the social rate of time preference and T is the total time
available to work in the economy (TL equals leisure). The current value
Hamiltonian for this problem is
H  W(CS, PS, LR)  λ1 [f(αK, βL, h)  C  δK]
λ2 [g(X)  h ([1  α]K, [1  β]L, X)]  λ3 [T  L],
where λ1 and λ2 are the costate variables for K and X, respectively, and λ3
is a Lagrangian multiplier for the labour constraint. The necessary con-
ditions for an interior solution are
 [W CS  W PS] [pCC]  W PSp  λ1  0 (4)
  W PS w  [W LR  WPS] wLL  λ1 [fL β  fh hL (1  β)] 
 λ2 hL [1  β]  λ3  0 (5)
 λ1 [fK K  fh hK K]  λ2 hK K  0 (6)
 λ1 [fL L  fh hL L]  λ2 hL L  0 (7)
λ˙1  r λ1  λ1 [fK α  fh hK (1  α)  δ]  λ2 hK (1  α) (8)
λ˙2  r λ2  λ1 fh hX  λ2 (gX  hX) (9)
T  L  0; λ3 [T  L]  0 (10)
and the equations of motion (2)–(3) along with the appropriate non-nega-
∂H
	∂β
∂H
	∂α
∂H
	∂L
∂H
	∂C
Max
	
L,I, α,β
100 Richard D. Horan et al.
8 We focus on the command optimum for convenience due to the large number of
instruments available to the planner. Note that many policies involve transfer
payments. In a decentralised optimum, the planner may evaluate changes in its
budget according to the effects on tax payers, with transfer payments modelled as
a fourth argument in the PPF. When policies are chosen optimally, the solution
will be the same (see Horan, Shortle and Bulte, 1999).
tive and transversality conditions.9 For simplicity, it is assumed that L  T
(i.e., leisure is consumed at positive levels) and thus λ3  0. The solution of
(2)–(10) along with the other appropriate conditions yields a politically
efficient path for all variables, C * (t),L * (t),α * (t),β * (t),K * (t),X * (t),λ1*(t)
and λ2*(t). The politically efficient values of the PPF and the Hamiltonian
are denoted W * (t) and H * (t), respectively.
Conditions (4)–(9) reveal several distributional tradeoffs facing the
planner. Equation (4) requires aggregate consumption to occur such that
the marginal political net benefit of additional consumption (the first two
terms) equals the marginal political opportunity cost of the additional con-
sumption, λ1. The first term, [WCS  WPS] [ pC C], is the political value of
the price reduction induced by additional consumption. Consumers
benefit from reduced prices while producers are made worse off.
Therefore, the willingness of the planner to pursue increased aggregate
consumption depends, in part, on the relative marginal political utility of
consumers and producers (i.e., WCS  WPS). The second term, WPS p, is the
additional revenue received by producers from a marginal increase in
sales, weighted by the marginal political utility for firms.
Equation (5) describes the political tradeoffs that occur from a marginal
increase in aggregate employment levels. The first term,  WPS w, is the
political value of the additional wages paid by producers from a marginal
increase in employment. The second term, [WLR  WPS] w L L, is the pol-
itical value of the wage increase induced by additional employment.
Labour benefits from increased wages while producers are made worse
off. The last two terms, λ1[fL β  fh hL (1  β)]  λ2 hL [1  β] (since λ3  0),
reflect the marginal political net benefits of increased production in each
market due to an increase in aggregate employment.
In equilibrium, equations (6) and (7) require that the political (and real)
long- and short-run marginal resource harvesting costs are equated, i.e.,
that λ1 fL / hL  λ1 fK / hK. Manipulating either (6) or (7) leads to the fol-
lowing condition
λ1 [fh  ]  λ2 (11)
Condition (11) requires that the political marginal rents from resource har-
vesting activities (the LHS) equal the political marginal user cost of the
resource, λ2.
Finally, conditions (8) and (9) are standard capital and natural capital
stock arbitrage conditions, in terms of political utility. Analogous con-
ditions have been discussed at length elsewhere (see Clark, 1990).
The solution to the necessary conditions (4)–(9) will only be economi-
cally efficient (i.e., aggregate economic surplus will be maximised) for the
special case in which W is linear with constant and equal weights (i.e., the
fL	
hL
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9 The second-order conditions are assumed to be satisfied at the optimum. This may
not always be the case. The policy implications resulting from an agency with a
PPF for which the second-order conditions are not satisfied, while interesting, are
not discussed here.
terms W i (iCS,PS,LR) are constant ∀t and WCS  WPS  WLR). Under
these conditions (4)–(7) simplify to
p  λ′1 (12)
fL  (13)
p[fh  ]  λ′2 (14)
where λ′i  λi/WPS (i  1,2). Equations (12) and (13) are standard efficiency
conditions and require no further explanation. In (14), the derived price for
the resource commodity is pfh, and the marginal resource harvesting cost is
pfL/hL  pfK/hK. Thus, (14) is the standard efficiency condition that equates
the shadow value of the resource with the marginal rents from harvesting
(Clark, 1990), In general, comparisons between the economically efficient
and politically efficient outcomes cannot be made without further restric-
tions on the model.
4. Green NNP
Unlike traditional models in which a linearised transformation of the
Hamiltonian equals NNPWHM, H*(t) is not easily transformed to become
a measure of green NNP.10 Instead, following Weitzman (1976) and
Aronsson and Löfgren (1998), it is straightforward to show that rV*(t) 
H * (t), where
V * (t)  ∞
t
W * (s)er(s  t) dt.
Thus, H * (t) is the maximum amount of politically weighted economic
surplus that can be obtained at any point in time while leaving total pol-
itical utility constant.
A measure of green NNP that reflects the distributional goals of policy
makers, denoted Political NNP or NNPP, can be derived from H * (t).
Nominal NNPP is the value of consumption, pC, plus the value of leisure,
wl (where l is leisure), plus the value that society applies to net (natural and
reproducible) capital investment (Mäler, 1991; Dasgupta, 1993). It is poss-
ible to obtain this value of net investment from H * (t). Following a line of
reasoning similar to that of Hamilton (1996), the shadow values λi (i  1,2)
represent the political value of net investment. These political values can
be transformed to monetary values through an appropriate normalisation
procedure. Because the economically efficient solution is a special case of
our model, it is clear from (12) and (14) that the appropriate transformation
involves normalising each shadow value by the optimal marginal political
utility of firms, W*PS. Then, nominal NNPP is
Nominal NNPP  pC  wl  λ′1 K˙  λ′2 X˙.
Real NNPP, or just NNPP, is obtained by normalising by the price level, p
NNPP  C  (w/p)l(λ′1/p)K˙  (λ′2/p)X˙. (15)
fL	
hL
w
	
p
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The formula for NNPP in (15) is the same as formulas derived in tra-
ditional green accounting models (see, e.g., Mäler, 1991; Dasgupta, 1993; or
note 10), with the exception of the shadow values of K˙ and X˙ (which reflect
the distributional goals of policy makers). This is as expected since the eco-
nomically efficient solution is a special case of our model, implying that
NNPWHM is a special case of NNPP. Except for this special case, however,
NNPP differs from NNPWHM in that NNPP is not the maximum amount
of production that can be consumed at any point in time while leaving
total wealth constant. This difference is due to the presence of distortions
in the economy.
There are two possible interpretations for the PPF and hence NNPP. The
first interpretation is that the planner’s preferences are actually defined by
the PPF, with the corresponding measure of NNPP defined as politically
efficient income, or NNPPE. NNPPE may not be accurately reflected by
market data if there are limits on the planner’s ability to maximise the PPF.
The second interpretation is that observed policies and outcomes are con-
sistent with the maximisation of such a function (i.e., a revealed preference
approach; see, e.g., Rausser and Foster, 1991). In this case, the optimal
values of λ′1 and λ′2 are the normalised values the planner actually applies
to changes in the capital and natural capital stocks, whether or not an eco-
nomically or politically efficient outcome is the result. Denote this measure
of NNPP as actual political income, or NNPPA, because it reflects the actual
(real and shadow) values applied in the market. NNPPA is consistent with
the philosophy that income is an ex post measure based on actual out-
comes. The two interpretations coincide for the special case in which actual
outcomes are politically efficient.
4.1 Interpretation of shadow values
Insights into the differences between NNPP and NNPWHM are obtained
by examining the normalised political shadow values. The normalised
shadow value λ′1 is derived from equation (4)
λ′1  [1  ePS,CS∈D]p, (16)
where ePS,CS  (WCS/WPS)  1, and ∈D  0 is the inverse elasticity of
demand. The term ePS,CS is defined as the marginal political preference for
consumers relative to producers (with respect to the intra-generational dis-
tribution of income). There is a marginal political preference for consumers
relative to producers when ePS,CS  0, a relative marginal political prefer-
ence for producers relative to consumers when ePS,CS  0, and a neutral
marginal political preference when ePS,CS  0.
As noted above, an economically efficient solution corresponds to the
planner having neutral marginal political preferences (i.e., it places equal
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10 NNPWHM is derived from the current value Hamiltonian corresponding to the
maximisation of ∫∞0 U(C,l)ert dt subject to (2) and (3) (where l is leisure). Denote
this Hamiltonian by HWHM  U  Ψ1 K˙  Ψ2 X˙, where Ψi is the ith costate vari-
able. Linearising U (i.e., U  U CC  Ull) and dividing by the marginal utility of
consumption, U C, we have NNPWHM  HWHM / U C  C  w l (Ψ1 / U C)
K˙  (Ψ2 / U C)X˙.
value on the welfare of all groups at the margin). In this case, λ′1  p, which
corresponds to a competitive outcome and standard accounting models
where the optimal shadow value of capital equals the marginal utility of
consumption (i.e., the price of the consumption good) (Hartwick, 1990;
Mäler, 1991). When ePS,CS  1, then the solution corresponds to a monop-
olistic outcome. Thus, the term ePS,CS can be viewed as a measure of the
extent to which firms have obtained benefits analogous to market power as
a result of the planner’s preferences (i.e., similar to a Herfindahl index).11
Values within the interval [1,0] describe the degree of politically induced
monopoly power.
The normalised shadow value λ′2 can be obtained from equations (11)
and (16)
λ′2  [1  ePS,CS∈D]pfh  . (17)
The normalised political marginal user cost (the LHS) equals the marginal
rent from harvesting (pfh  pfL/hL), adjusted to reflect the political tradeoffs
between producers and consumers (1  ePS,CS∈D). Specifically, with more
harvests, production of the consumption good increases. A marginal
increase in production causes the price of C to fall. Consumers benefit
while producers are worse off from this lower price. However, producers
benefit from the additional rents that come from increased production at
the margin.
When ePS,CS  0 (i.e., consumers and producers are valued equally at the
margin), λ′2 equals the marginal rent from harvesting, just as in the eco-
nomically efficient case (see, e.g., Hartwick, 1990). When ePS,CS  1/∈D,
there is a marginal political preference for producers relative to con-
sumers, and λ′2  0. This is similar to a situation of unregulated open access
because no intertemporal costs are associated with resource harvesting.12
Therefore, in addition to being a measure of market power, values of ePS,CS
∈[1/∈D,0] represent an index of the degree of economic efficiency associ-
ated with the management of the natural resource stock.
4.2 Policy implications and comparison with alternative green NNP measures
Green NNP is useful as a guide for domestic and international policy 
only to the extent that it accurately reflects the goals of policy makers. 
As suggested above, the relation between NNPP and NNPWHM is
ambiguous without further specifying the model, regardless of which
interpretation of NNPP is used. NNPP may be greater or lesser than
NNPWHM depending on the structure of the PPF, production and har-
vesting technologies, and the structure of the final output and labour
markets.
Even with further specification, however, comparison is likely to be pro-
hibitive because NNPWHM (NNPPE) is not consistent with market data
fL
	
hL
104 Richard D. Horan et al.
11 See, e.g., Nelson and Roberts (1989) for a discussion of social preferences and
market power, and Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Martin (1993) for dis-
cussions of market structure and indices of market power.
12 Unlike pure open access, it is not required that the marginal rents from har-
vesting be zero. Instead, they may be positive due to limited access as opposed to
future considerations.
when the actual decisions in an economy are not economically (politically)
efficient. When market inefficiencies exist, Dasgupta (1993) proposes that
NNP is appropriately specified by applying economically efficient prices
and shadow values to actual production and consumption choices and
actual changes in capital and natural capital. This income measure is con-
sistent with the framework used to derive NNPWHM, taking into account
neither the political and institutional constraints facing policy makers, nor
distributional considerations. In general, the relation between Dasgupta’s
measure and NNPPA (or a variant of NNPPE derived in a manner similar to
Dasgupta’s measure) is ambiguous without further specification of the
model.
In practice, determining economically efficient prices and shadow
values may be prohibitively difficult. Instead, actual prices are typically
used as proxies for efficient prices. In addition, the actual price of the con-
sumption good, p, and the actual marginal rents from resource harvesting,
ρ2, have been suggested for use as proxies for the economically efficient
shadow values associated with the capital and natural capital stocks,
respectively (Hartwick, 1990). This market-based measure of NNP,
denoted NNPM, has been used in practice (e.g., Hrubovcak, LeBlanc and
Eakin, 1995; Crowards, 1995; Motta and May, 1996) to reflect the frame-
work behind Dasgupta’s income measure.13
In the context of the current model, NNPM is formally defined as (15)
under the assumption that ePS,CS  0. Clearly, NNPM will differ from 
NNPPA in most situations. This difference can be defined explicitly. Let ρ1
be the measured shadow value of capital corresponding to NNPM (i.e., ρ1
 p). The difference, ∆  NNPPA  NNPM, is then defined as
∆  [λ′1  ρ1]K˙ [λ′2  ρ2]X˙
which simplifies to
∆  Θ [ρ1 K˙  ρ2 X˙],
where Θ   ePS,CS∈D. The only instances in which NNPPA and NNPM will
be equivalent are in the steady state, when there is no appreciation or
depreciation of (natural) capital, or when the actual allocation is economi-
cally efficient, i.e., NNPP  NNPWHM. Apart from these special cases, ∆ is
diminished (but does not necessarily vanish) when there is unregulated
open access harvesting of the resource stock. In this case, λ′2  ρ2  0;
however, it is not certain that λ′1  ρ1 due to potential distortions in the
capital market.
It is realistically expected that Θ  0. Given this assumption, the sign of
∆ is
∆  0 if K˙ , X˙  0
∆  0 if K˙ , X˙  0
∆  0 if K˙  0 , X˙  0 or K˙  0 , X˙  0.	
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Other things equal, NNPPA will be larger (smaller) than NNPM during
periods of capital and natural capital stock depreciation (appreciation).
However, the sign of ∆ is ambiguous when capital and natural capital
stocks move in opposite directions. The most likely case for many coun-
tries is K˙  0 , X˙  0.
There are two important implications of this analysis. First, economies
may be managed to deplete (or accumulate) their natural capital stocks
because they may lead to increased political income (NNPP). However,
depending on the structure of the preference function, production and har-
vesting technologies, and the structure of the final output and labour
markets, political income may or may not be correlated with sustainable
income measures. Indeed, sustainable income measures may provide no
indication as to what a country perceives its actual income to be, and may
therefore be of limited value in guiding policy choices.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that political income may or may not be cor-
related with sustainable income measures. We recognise, however, that
efficiency-based income measures are not without their place. Indeed,
economic efficiency is an accepted and well-understood criterion and is
invariant to alternative political regimes and institutional constraints.
Multiple income measures may therefore be useful. Sustainable income
(i.e., the Weitzman–Hartwick–Mäler measure of green NNP) is the income
level that would be attained in an economically efficient economy. A
second useful income measure is based on Dasgupta’s (1993) recommen-
dation of applying economically efficient shadow values to actual changes
in capital and natural capital. Dasgupta’s income measure, which values
actual decisions with economically efficient (shadow) prices, can be used
to evaluate an economy’s performance relative to the economically effi-
cient benchmark. A final valuable income measure is political NNP
because it is based on actual political goals and policies. Together, political
NNP and Dasgupta’s measure provide a more complete picture of
economic well-being and economic performance than could be provided
by either when used separately. For example, these measures would 
be useful in explaining why actual choices are made even though they 
do not increase income as measured in the traditional sense. Moreover,
when used together, political NNP and Dasgupta’s income measure
provide a useful guide for designing domestic and international macro-
economic policies to enhance economic development in third world
countries.
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